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**„The Theory of Emergence and Mind-Body Relation Problems”**

The presented dissertation is a work in the field of analytical philosophy of mind. Its purpose is to analyze the psychophysical relationship in the context of emergence theory and attempt to verify whether the postulate of top-down causality is defensible without having to reject the basic assumptions of physicalism. And if some of its postulates (like the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain) are rejected, I will try to determine whether modern emergence positions give sufficient reasons for this rejection.

The basic question posed in this work is not how consciousness is possible, but how it is possible that mental events are causally effective. So this is a question about the meaning of the mental. Pepper argued that emergent quantifying laws regarding basic macroscopic features are epiphenomenal because we can also represent "new" macroscopic phenomena as part of a more comprehensive physical theory. With regard to this objection, (1) the thesis is: If emergent properties exist and actually (partly) causally account for new behaviors, they are not epiphenomenal, even if there is an empirically adequate description of the trajectories of the microscopic elements constituting such behaviors. Pepper's next accusation indicates that there has never been a compelling reason to postulate the existence of emergent property, instead of extending our basic theory to adapt to "unusual" macroscopic behavior. Due to this, I introduce (2) an auxiliary thesis: Where there is a discontinuity in microscopic behavior related to precisely defined macroscopic parameters, emergent system properties are clearly implied, unless we can obtain equally elegant lower-level theory (resulting theory) by complexity of the structure of the already established set of basic properties. Accordingly, we cannot explain certain human behaviors simply by referring to neuronal processes. We must assume higher-order cognitive functions. The most common objection to this variation of emergence is that it violates the principle of transitive causality and assumes the existence of inexplicable causal powers (and thus also violates the principle of causal closure of the physical domain). However, assuming a purposeful order of the world and a teleological approach to evolution, it is acceptable that causal and rational principles of operation are interconnected with each other. In this case top-down causality is possible, which occurs simultaneously with bottom-up causality. In this paper I will indicate two positions that postulate this type of part-whole interaction: Gillett's supervenient emergentism, taking the thesis on composition, and Ellis's non-supervenient emergentism,

supplemented by the statement about O'Connor's agent-causation. I will consider which of these two positions is more attractive to the anti-reductionist in the context of the mind-body problem.

In the dissertation, I try to show that emergent laws of behavior are not contrary to the goal of modern science, in which we now see a tendency to build cross-level theories. This applies especially to neurocognitive theories. However, this is a statement contrary to the popular belief of supporters of reductionist solutions, who claim that emergent laws are redundant and can be reduced to more basic rights, including by means of functionalization or by extending fundamental theory. I will argue with this position in this work.

*Maxine Farnell*